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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court err in finding that Plaintiff Home Abstract1, a substitute 
plaintiff, did not have standing to pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title action? 
Determinative Law: 
"In case of any transfer of interest, the court [may] upon motion direct the person 
to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the 
original party." Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c). 
n[W]hen there is no objection from a defendant to the granting of a motion for 
substitution of a plaintiff, the defendant may not later claim that the proper party is not 
present." Investors Mortgage Co. v. Rodia, 31 Conn. App. 476, 481 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1993). 
"[Substituted party takes the case as he finds i t . . . " Brook, Weiner, Sered, Kreger 
& Weinberg v. Coreq, Inc., 53 F.3d 851, 852 (7th Cir. 1995). 
Boston Ave. Man., Inc. v. Assoc. Resources, Inc., 152 P.3d 880 (Okla. 2007). 
Briggs v. Hess, 252 P.2d 538 (Utah 1953). 
Corbin v. Blankenburg, 39 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 1994). 
ELCA Ent., Inc. v. Sisco Equipment Rental, Inc., 53 F.3d 186 (8th Cir. 1995). 
This brief essentially involves two plaintiffs: the original plaintiff and the substitute 
plaintiff. For clarity sake, this brief will refer to the original plaintiff as "original 
plaintiff and the substitute plaintiff as "Plaintiff Home Abstract." 
Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enters. Corp., 817 F.2d 894 (1st Cir. 1987). 
Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426 (1991). 
In re: Bernal 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2000). 
Kirk v.Pope, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 692, % 29 (Miss. 2007) 
Looney v. Raby, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 778,1} 7 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). 
Minnesota Mining Co. v. ECO Chem., Inc., 757 F.2d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
Montecatini Societa Generale Per L'Industria Mineraria E Chimica v. Humble Oil 
& Refining Co., 261 F. Supp 587 (D. Md. 1966). 
Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1971). 
Standard of Review: 
When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, the Appellate Court should give 
no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and should review the legal issues 
presented under a correctness standard. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharm., Inc., 2003 
UT 43, f 14,79 P.3d 922, 927. 
Demonstration that Issue Was Preserved in the District Court: 
In the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment before Judge Jones, counsel for Plaintiff Home 
Abstract argued, on at least two occasions, that Plaintiff Home Abstract had standing 
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because Plaintiff Home Abstract was the substitute plaintiff and had "stepped into the 
shoes" of the original plaintiff [Tr. 13, 30]2. 
DETERMINATrVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(c): 
Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or 
against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the 
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. 
Service of the motion shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule. 
OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(c): 
Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or 
against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the 
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. 
Service of the motion shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter involves a piece of real property that is referred to by the parties as the 
"Eccles Property" and which is located in Ogden, Weber County, Utah. [Tr. 3]. The 
original plaintiff in this matter was Corey Vandenberg. [R. 1-9]. The original plaintiff 
commenced this action by filing a Complaint to Quiet Title in the Second District Court 
for Weber County on or about April 28, 2004. [R. 1-9]. The original plaintiff 
subsequently amended his,Complaint to Quiet Title on or about May 3, 2004. [R. 9-19]. 
The original plaintiff claimed title to the Eccles Property by virtue of two deeds (i) a 
November 29, 2003 Quit-Claim Deed from Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes to 
2
 References to the trial court record appear as [R. ]. References to the transcript of 
Summary Judgment Motions from the August 6, 2007 hearing before Judge Jones appear 
as [Tr.__J. 
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Wheelock Holdings, LLC and (ii) a March 25, 2004 Warranty Deed from Raymond and 
Valerie Vanderdoes. [R. 1-8, 497-503, 431-32]. No claim has ever been made that Mr. 
Vandenberg lacked standing to assert a quiet title against the Eccles Property. 
Defendants claim title to the Eccles Property by virtue of an April 15, 2004 Warranty 
Deed from Matthew Brown, the purported Trustee of the Vanderdoes Eccles Land Trust. 
[Tr. 4-5]; [R. 23-8, 85-7]. 
The original plaintiff actively prosecuted this matter until November 6, 2006 when 
Plaintiff Home Abstract purchased the Eccles Property from the original plaintiff and was 
substituted as the real party in interest by Order of the District Court. [Tr. 8]; [R. 312-13]. 
On or about October 24, 2006, the original plaintiff and Defendant stipulated to the 
substitution of Plaintiff Home Abstract as the real party in interest in this matter in the 
place of the original plaintiff. [R. 293-94]. While neither the stipulation nor the Order of 
Substitution directly reference Rule 25(c), it is clear from the language and context of the 
stipulation and the Order that the substitution is being made pursuant to Rule 25(c). 
Prior to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about May 
14, 2007, no claim had ever been made that Plaintiff Home Abstract lacked standing to 
assert an action to quiet title against the Eccles Property and Defendant has never 
objected to the substitution of Plaintiff Home Abstract as the substitute plaintiff Since 
November 6, 2004, Plaintiff Home Abstract has actively prosecuted this matter as a 
substitute plaintiff. [R. 312-608]. 
On August 6, 2007, this matter came before the Honorable Judge Jones of the 
Second District Court for Weber County for oral arguments on Plaintiff Home Abstract's 
644 :75215vl 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
[R. 572]. Judge Jones of the Second District Court, after considering the respective 
arguments, denied Plaintiff Home Abstract's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted 
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment by finding that Plaintiff Home 
Abstract lacked standing to bring a quiet title action against the Eccles Property, despite 
Plaintiff Home Abstract's status as substitute plaintiff. [R. 573-75]; [Tr. 33-4]. 
Plaintiff Home Abstract filed an appeal from the District Court's final Order on 
August 30, 2007. [R. 576-77]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. On or about November 29, 2003, the original plaintiff in this matter, Corey 
Vandenberg, acquired an interest in a piece of real property on Eccles Avenue in Ogden, 
Utah (hereinafter the "Eccles Property"). [Tr. 8]. Said ownership interest was conveyed 
in a Quit-Claim Deed from Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes to Wheelock Holding, 
LLC, an expired Utah limited liability company owned and operated by the original 
plaintiff. [Tr. 8]. 
2. On or about March 25, 2004, the original plaintiff entered into a purchase 
and settlement agreement with Raymond Vanderdoes and Valerie Vanderdoes to 
effectuate his purchase of the Eccles Property. [R. 410-17, 425-28, 497-503, 504-16]. 
3. On or about March 25, 2004, Vandenberg received a Warranty Deed from 
the Vanderdoeses in connection with his March 25, 2004 purchase. [Tr. 8]; [R. 418-19, 
497-503,504-16]. 
/LA A - T O 1 C-.1 
4. On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes, under 
allegedly dubious circumstances, executed a Trust Agreement whereby they established 
the Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes Eccles Land Trust (hereinafter the "Vanderdoes 
Land Trust"). [Tr. 3-4]; [R. 438-46, 497-503, 504-16]. 
5. On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes, under 
allegedly dubious circumstances, executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying their interest in 
the Eccles Property to the Vanderdoes Land Trust. [Tr. 3-4]; [R. 450-51, 497-503, 504-
16]. 
6. On or about April 15, 2004, Warren Brown, the purported Trustee of the 
Vanderdoes Land Trust, executed a Warranty Deed conveying the interest of the 
Vanderdoes Land Trust in the Eccles Property to Defendant. [Tr. 4]; [R. 497-503, 504-
16]. 
7. The original plaintiff, Corey Vandenberg, filed a Complaint to Quiet Title 
as to the Eccles Property in the Second District Court for Weber County on April 28, 
2004. [R. 1-9]. The original plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint with the 
Second District Court on May 3, 2004. [R. 10-19]. 
8. On or about October 24, 2004, the original plaintiff and Defendant signed a 
Stipulation to Substitute Real Party in Interest, stipulating to the substitution of Plaintiff 
Home Abstract as the real party in interest in the underlying litigation in the place of the 
original plaintiff [R. 293-294]. 
9. On or about November 6, 2006, Judge Jones of the Second District Court 
for Weber County entered an Order of Substitution substituting Plaintiff Home Abstract 
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as the real party in interest in this matter in the place of the original plaintiff. [R. 312-
13]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal asks the Court to address a narrow legal question: does a substitute 
plaintiff, substituted pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by an 
Order of the District Court, acquire the original plaintiffs standing to pursue the original 
plaintiffs claims; and did the District Court err in Finding that Plaintiff Home Abstract, 
as a substitute plaintiff, did not have standing to pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title 
action? This narrow issue appears to be an issue of first impression for Utah appellate 
courts. 
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a substitute plaintiff, upon 
an Order of the District Court, to step into the shoes of an original plaintiff and prosecute 
the plaintiffs original claims. While Rule 25(c) has not been subject to extensive review 
by Utah Courts, the majority of federal and state jurisdictions have held, while reviewing 
nearly identical procedural rules governing the substitution of parties, that a party 
substitution allows the substitute plaintiff to step into the procedural position of the 
original plaintiff and enjoy the same procedural characteristics as the original plaintiff. 
The original plaintiff in this action clearly and undisputedly had standing to pursue the 
quiet title actions at issue before the District Court. As a result, when Plaintiff Home 
Abstract was substituted, by an undisputed order of the Court, as substitute plaintiff in the 
District Court action, Plaintiff Home Abstract stepped into the original plaintiffs 
procedural position and acquired, by virtue of the Rule 25(c) substitution, standing to 
AAA l ^ l ^ / l mm 
pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title action against the Eccles Property. Therefore, 
Judge Jones of the Second District Court for Weber County erred in finding that Plaintiff, 
a substitute plaintiff, did not have standing to pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title 
action. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF HOME 
ABSTRACT, A SUBSTITUTE PLAINTIFF, DID NOT HAVE STANDING 
TO PURSUE THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF'S QUIET TITLE ACTION. 
Plaintiff Home Abstract had standing to pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title 
actions by virtue of the fact that it was substituted as a real party in interest in place of the 
original plaintiff pursuant to Rule 25(c) and by an undisputed Order of the District Court. 
Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides a legal mechanism by 
which third-parties can be substituted into the position of one of the original parties 
involved in a case on file with the Court. Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows the Court, in the case of a transfer of interest in and to property, to 
substitute the real party in interest into the position of the original party. Rule 25(c) 
provides in relevant part: 
In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or 
against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the 
person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action 
or joined with the original party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c) 
Rule 25(c) essentially gives the District Court two options when a transfer of 
interest in and to property has occurred: (1) allow litigation to proceed as among the 
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original parties; or (2) allow upon motion the real party in interest to be substituted into 
the action. See Briggs v. Hess, 252 P.2d 538, 538-39 (Utah 1953) (reviewing the use of 
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). Other than the Briggs case, Rule 25(c) 
has not been the subject of extensive judicial review by the Utah Courts and, as a result, 
there is little case law addressing the requirements necessary to effectuate a Rule 25(c) 
substitution or the effects of such a substitution. Various federal and state courts, 
however, have had ample opportunity to interpret the nearly identical provisions of Rule 
25(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and various other state procedural codes. 
While the Court is not bound by other courts' applications of other procedural rules, it is 
generally recognized that when a court is asked to define terms found in Utah state rules, 
the court should look to other jurisdictions with similar language for guidance, especially 
when there is little Utah law on the specific issue before the court. State v. Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46, % 23, 79 P.3d 937, 944. 
Federal and state courts have consistently required that a court find, prior to 
allowing a Rule 25(c) substitution, that the substituted party has in fact acquired the 
interest of the original plaintiff. See Montecatini Societa Generale Per L'Industria 
Mineraria E Chimica v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 261 F. Supp 587, 592 (D. Md. 
1966) (noting that a Rule 25(c) substitution is proper if the substitute party has in fact 
succeeded to the interest of the original plaintiff); Boston Avenue Management Inc. v. 
Associated Resources, Inc., 152 P.3d 880, 887 (Okla. 2007) (holding that substitution is 
appropriate when the substitute party has acquired the interest of the original party). 
Courts have, however, held that when there is no objection from the non-substituting 
party to the granting of a motion for substitution, the non-substituting party is barred 
from later objecting to the substitution. See Investors Mortgage Co. v. Rodia, 31 Conn. 
App. 476, 481 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) ("when there is no objection from a defendant to 
the granting of a motion for substitution of a plaintiff, the defendant may not later claim 
that the proper party is not present"); Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enters. Corp., 
817 F.2d 894, 906 (1st Cir. 1987) (implying that once the non-substituting party has had a 
chance to challenge the proposed substitution, the non-substituting party cannot later 
object to the substitution). 
Once an appropriate substitution has occurred, the majority of courts have 
consistently held that the substitute party steps into the procedural position of the original 
party. See Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that the 
substituted party steps into the same position as the original party); Corbin v. 
Blankenburg, 39 F.3d 650, 654 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the substitute party "steps 
into the shoes of predecessor"); Brook, Weiner, Sered, Kreger & Weinberg v. Coreq, 
Inc., 53 F.3d 851, 852 (7th Cir. 1995) ("substituted party takes the case as he finds it"); 
ELCA Enterprises, Inc. v. Sisco Equipment Rental & Sales, Inc., 53 F.3d 186, 191 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (noting that a Rule 25 substitution does not affect the procedural posture of the 
underlying case); In re: Bernal, 207 F.3d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the 
substitute party stands in the shoes of the original party with respect to all phases of the 
litigation); Investors Mortgage Co., 31 Conn. App. at 481 (noting that the substitute 
plaintiff steps into the "shoes" of the original plaintiff); Kirk v. Pope, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 
692, T| 29 (Miss. 2007) (commenting that the substituted party steps into the procedural 
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position of the original party); and Looney v. Raby, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 778, f 7 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that substitution shall have the same effect as if the action 
had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest). At least one commentator 
on the Federal Rules has agreed with the position taken in the above-cited cases and has 
concluded that, in the case of a Rule 25 substitution, the substituted party steps into the 
procedural position of the original party. See Moore's Federal Practice - Civil, § 25.33. 
The majority of courts have held that procedural characteristics such as diversity 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue are effectively transferred, by virtue of a 
Rule 25(c) substitution, from the original plaintiff to the substitute plaintiff See 
Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428-29 (1991) (reviewing a 
case on appeal from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and deciding diversity jurisdiction 
is not destroyed by the subsequent Rule 25(c) substitution of a non-diverse party); 
Explosives Corp. of Am., 817 F.2d at 906 ("once in personam has been found over the 
original party it exists over the substituted party despite the substituted party's lack of 
contacts with the forum"); and Minnesota Mining Co. v. ECO Chem., Inc., 757 F.2d 
1256, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that after a Rule 25(c) substitution, the merits of the 
case and disposition of the property is determined as if it proceeded between the 
originally named parties and noting that the original venue is not destroyed by the 
substitution of a third-party). While courts have not directly addressed the issue of 
whether an original plaintiffs standing is transferred to the substitute plaintiff, it appears 
clear from the cases cited above that courts are quick to allow the substitute plaintiff to 
acquire, by virtue of substitution, the original plaintiffs procedural characteristics. 
£AA 7 < ; - > 1 ^ , , l 
The application of Rule 25(c) espoused by the Courts in the above-cited cases is 
sound and should be adopted by the Utah Courts. The purpose of Rule 25(c) is to allow 
and facilitate the free transfer of interests in disputed property during the course of an 
action. The judicial applications of Rule 25(c) that have been discussed above, allow 
parties to freely transfer interests in disputed property without disrupting the procedural 
framework of the action. If Rule 25(c) was applied differently so that the transfer of 
interest in property required a change of the procedural stance of an ongoing action such 
an application would (1) deter normal business transactions during the pendency of the 
action , and/or (2) encourage parties to an action to seek to structure transfers or pursue 
unnecessary substitutions in ways that would best suit their position. Both of these 
alternative applications would stifle the open and free alienation of property interests and 
possibly have the effect of multiplying and complicating property centered litigation. At 
the very least, these alternative approaches would circumvent the apparent purpose of 
Rule 25(c). For this reason, Plaintiff Home Abstract urges this Court to adopt the 
reasoning of the cases cited above and decide that a substituted plaintiff acquires, by 
virtue of Rule 25(c) substitution, the standing and other procedural characteristics of the 
original plaintiff. 
In this case, the original plaintiff clearly and undisputedly had standing to pursue a 
quiet title action against the Eccles Property. At the very least, the original plaintiff had 
an alleged title to the Eccles Property. See State v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 
1979) (holding that for a party to bring a quiet title action it must at least be able to allege 
title to the disputed property). Defendant appears to acknowledge the fact that the 
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original plaintiff had standing to pursue a quiet title action against the Eccles Property. 
[Tr. 32]. 
On October 24, 2006, Defendant signed a Stipulation to Substitute Real Party in 
Interest substituting Plaintiff Home Abstract in the place of the original plaintiff. [R. 293-
94]. By signing the stipulation, Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff Home Abstract 
could take the place of the original plaintiff and effectively waived its right to object to 
the substitution of Plaintiff Home Abstract as the substitute plaintiff On November 6, 
2006, Judge Jones of the Second District Court for Weber County entered an Order of 
Substitution, substituting Plaintiff Home Abstract in the place of the original plaintiff. 
[Tr. 312-13]. While neither the stipulation nor the Order of Substitution directly 
reference Rule 25(c), it is clear from the language and context of the stipulation and the 
Order that the substitution is being made pursuant to Rule 25(c). 
When Plaintiff Home Abstract was substituted by Order of the Court as substitute 
plaintiff in the District Court action, Plaintiff Home Abstract stepped into the original 
plaintiffs procedural position and acquired, by virtue of the Rule 25(c) substitution, 
standing to pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title action. Therefore, Judge Jones of the 
Second District Court for Weber County erred in finding that Plaintiff, as a substitute 
plaintiff, did not have standing to pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
the District Court's decision holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a quiet title 
£AA " 7 0 1C..1 
action as against the Eccles Property and remand this matter to the District Court for 
additional proceedings. 
DATED this \*b day of January, 2008. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
lUU\\iQJU}^ 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Richard H. Reeve 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Home Abstract 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
Exhibit A. Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
Exhibit B. Stipulation to Substitute Real Party in Interest 
Exhibit C. Order of Substitution 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ t ^ l day of January, 2008,1 caused two (2) copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed in the United States mail, first class, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Evan Strassberg 
YOUNG, HOFFMAN, STRASSBERG & ENSOR 
170 South Main, Suite 1125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendant/'Ape He e 
ORR Enterprises, Inc. 
S1XAPJN-> X J x l l l ^ 
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YOUNG, HOFFMAN, STRASSBERG & ENSOR, LLP 
Evan S. Strassberg (8279) iD DISTRICT COURT 
Richard F. Ensor( 10877) 
170 South Main St., Suite 1125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 159-1900 
Attorneys for Defendant Orr Enterprises, Inc. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOME ABSTRACT & TITLE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
WARREN MATTHEW BROWN and 
ORR ENTERPRISES, INC. 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040903182 
Hon. Ernie W. Jones 
% 
'fy 
This matter came before the Court on August 6, 2007, for a hearing on Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Defendant ORR Enterprises, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Having considered the Parties' briefing and the arguments of counsel, and finding 
good cause therefore, the Court rules as follows: 
Defendant Orr Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED for the 
reasons set forth in ORR's briefing on the Motion. The Court finds there are no disputed issues 
of material fact and that ORR is entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing Home 
Abstract's claims because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claims set forth in the Second 
VD19771518 pages: 
040903182 BROWN,WARREN MATTHEW 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff Home Abstract & Title Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. 
ENTERED this /5Bay of August, 2007. 
By: 
adge Ernie Jones 
Second District Court Jildge 
Approved as to form: 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Timothy Blackburn 
Richard Reeve 
Counsel for Plaintiff Home Abstract & Title Company 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this T _ day of August, 2007,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Richard Reeve 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
2404 Washington Blvd., Suite 900 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Evan S. Strassberg 
3 
Addendum Exhibit "B" 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY ' - ' • v • 
Timothy W. Blackburn (0355) 2H%QPJ „ 
Mara A. Brown (7364) PM 2: ?Q 
Attorneys for Plaintiff " 
2404 Washington Blvd., Suite 900 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
Facsimile: (801) 627-2522 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 









PARTY IN INTEREST 
Civil No. 040903182 
Honorable Ernie W. Jones 
Comes now plaintiff CORY VANDENBERG, by and through his counsel of record, 
and defendant ORR ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., by and through its counsel of record, and hereby 
stipulate to the following: 
1. THE HOME ABSTRACT AND TITLE COMPANY, INC. can be substituted 
for the plaintiff COREY VANDENBERG, and made a party to this litigation in place of 
COREY VANDENBERG as it is the real party in interest in this litigation. 
DATED this V) day of ( ) O H > V ^ , 2006. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
~ 7 ^ ^ : / 1 - iO~ 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Mara A. Brown 
274 64904V1 
MATHESON & PESHELL, L.L.C. 
/ 
Rinehart L. Peshell 
Attorney for Defendant ORR Enterprises, LLC 
274 64904V1 
Addendum Exhibit "C 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W. Blackburn (0355) 
Mara A. Brown (7364) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2404 Washington Blvd., Suite 900 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
Facsimile: (801) 627-2522 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COREY VANDENBERG, 
I ORDER OF 
Plaintiff, SUBSTITUTION 
vs. Civil No. 040903182 
WARREN MATTHEW BROWN and ORR Honorable Ernie W. Jones 
ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., 
Defendant. 
Inasmuch as the parties have entered into a Stipulation pertaining to the substitution of 
real party in interest for plaintiff COREY VANDENBERG, and for good cause appearing it 
is: 
HEREBY THE ORDER OF THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. THE HOME ABSTRACT AND TITLE COMPANY, INC. is hereby 
substituted for plaintiff COREY VANDENBERG, and made a party to this litigation in place 
of COREY VANDENBERG. 
274 64904V1 
fa day of HaJ^lh^l DATED this V_ day of ' fWm/U^/ 2006 
k'/£r<ltt 3°P 
Honorable Ernie Jones 
District Court Judge 
Approval as to Form and Content: 
MATHESON & PESHELL, L.L.C. 
R i n ^ r t L. Peshell 
Attorney for Defendant ORR Enterprises, L.L. C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
SUBSTITUTION was mailed, postage prepaid, this 4 day of Q d t u W p 2006, to 
the following: 
Rinehart L. Peshell 
MATHESON & PESHELL, L.L.C. 
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Defendant ORR Enterprises, L.L. C. 
XVJLJU- >y \ J J J O J U ~ v!yuv^ 
274 64904V1 
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